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This Essay offers a critical yet constructive reading of the social science approach to 
international law. In seeking to frame international legal studies alongside the positivistic social 
sciences, the social science approach has suffered from important methodological deficiencies. 
Though appearing to be an objective science, the social science approach requires a scholar to make 
subjective decisions throughout the research process. A reductionistic social science approach to 
international law risks consolidating existing inequalities and imperialistic institutions in the 
name of objective science. A healthy interaction between international law and the social sciences 
requires enriched conceptions of both international law and the social sciences, as well as a proper 
perspective on their working relationship. This dynamic perspective recognizes the constitutive role 
of international law in carrying out the social science approach. It further emphasizes the 
importance of internalizing interdisciplinarity within international legal scholarship itself. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The social science approach to international law, as advocated by Daniel 
Abebe, Adam Chilton, and Tom Ginsburg, is a recent academic effort to frame 
international legal studies alongside the positivistic, fact-based, and empirical 
social sciences. The social science approach starts “with a healthy skepticism about 
the efficacy of law” and tests “hypotheses about how international law works in 
practice” through observation and data collection.1 By describing and explaining 
what the world is, the social science approach reclaims the methodological rigor, 
scientism, and legitimacy of international law. 
The social science approach should be understood within the context of the 
law and society movement of American legal academia, which harbors a long-
standing tradition of skepticism toward the normative-formalistic concept of law. 
Its application to international law motivates a wide range of approaches including 
the New Haven School,2 economic analysis of international law,3 international law 
and international relations,4 international law as behavior,5 the empirical turn,6 the 
experimental turn,7 and others. Yet, at a time when international law is increasingly 
perceived as “indeterminate and illegitimate” in the United States,8 the call for a 
social science approach may be understood as an attempt to reclaim its domestic 
relevance by recourse to empirical methods and scientism. 
Contrary to a simplistic polarization between the normative approach and 
empirical research, this Essay suggests that the relationship between international 
law and the social sciences is complex and nuanced. A detailed account of their 
relationship casts light on the possibilities and limitations of the social science 
approach, and also provides useful insights for developing an inclusive and 
engaging international legal scholarship. 
 
1  See Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton & Tom Ginsburg, The Social Science Approach to International Law, 
22 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 19, 5 (2021). 
2  See generally Oran R. Young, International Law and Social Science: The Contributions of Myres S. McDougal, 
66 AM. J. INT’L L. 60 (1972); WESLEY L. GOULD & MICHAEL BARKUN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1970). 
3  See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
4  See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations: A Dual Agenda, 
87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205 (1993). 
5  See generally Harlan Grant Cohen & Timothy Meyer, International Law as Behavior, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AS BEHAVIOR 1 (Harlan Grant Cohen & Timothy Meyer eds., 2021). 
6  See generally Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 
106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012). 
7  See generally Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, Experimenting with International Law, 28 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 1317 (2017). 
8  See Paul B. Stephan, Comparative International Law, Foreign Relations Law, and Fragmentation, in 
COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (Anthea Roberts et al. eds., 2018).  
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II.  SOCIAL SCIENCES W ITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW  
The traditional, normative approach to international law is not at all 
antagonistic to scientism.9 Instead, the normative approach seeks to build its 
legitimacy and relevance by a claim to normative objectivity and certainty. Rules 
are objective, their meanings are ascertainable, and they separate international law 
from both morality and politics. 
Under the normative approach, the main task of international lawyers is to 
ascertain and clarify rules of international law in an objectively verifiable way. As 
international law is represented as a system of objective rules and principles, the 
idea of scientism deeply informs its doctrinal construction. International law is 
discoverable through a process of neutral scientific inquiry, and the 
authoritativeness of the norms depends upon the correct application of the 
scientific method to international law. 
The scientific nature of international law is crystalized in the doctrine of its 
sources. The idea of scientism has been used to enhance the credibility of 
international law as a discipline in the eyes of politicians and theorists.10 It also 
embodies the positivistic tradition of international law.11 It is no surprise that the 
rise of positivism is accompanied by the corresponding infusion of scientism into 
international legal studies. 
The normative approach is not blind to sociology, either. Rather, it has its 
own conceptions of sociology, power, and knowledge. Beneath the construction 
of the doctrine lies a profound sociological understanding of the international 
society.12 For example, positivism reflects the political reality of the monopolistic 
position of the nation-state in international relations, marginalizing the role of 
nonstate actors in the making of international law. In recognizing the 
decentralized structure of international society, positivism also privileges the great 
powers in the lawmaking process. 
A close look at the doctrine of customary international law illustrates the 
underlying sociology. Secondary rules on the ascertainment of customary law 
express the sociological reality of international society. The requirement of 
 
9  See Anne Orford, Scientific Reason and the Discipline of International Law, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 369 (2014). 
10  See L. Oppenheim, Science of International Law Its Tasks and Method, 2 AM. J. INT’L L. 313, 323–24 
(1908). 
11  See Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International 
Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 18 (1999). 
12  For a useful account on positivism from the lens of normative politics, see Benedict Kingsbury, 
Legal Positivism as Normative Politics: International Society, Balance of Power and Oppenheim’s Positive 
International Law, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 401 (2002). 
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concreteness is to render as much as possible the proposed norm in conformity 
with existing state practice.13 
There are many telling examples in this regard. For a new rule to emerge, 
state practice has to be extensive and virtually uniform.14 Further, the practice of 
the “specifically affected states” is given full weight. 15  In conceding to the 
dominant role of great powers, physical acts are weighed more heavily than verbal 
acts. The “persistent objector” doctrine is practically reserved for those states who 
can persistently object to an emerging rule, despite it being affirmed by a great 
majority of states—a possibility only open to a handful of great powers.16 
In setting the law-making procedures, international law internalizes its 
perceptions of prevailing social conditions. The sociological account is implicit in 
the normative approach. Yet, international legal scholars have traditionally stayed 
silent on those normative ideals about the world. Once entering the realms of the 
sociological and the political, it would be a self-defeating exercise to an 
international law project that claims to reject politics and morality. By convention, 
international lawyers are trained as experts in normative jurisprudence, rather than 
as social or political scientists. This mindset of avoidance has had structural 
impacts on the works of international lawyers. It has curtailed the ambition and 
willingness of international lawyers to engage with external disciplines. It also 
causes confusion for many who are trapped in the formalistic approach and yet 
see the political disagreements not surmountable by legal techniques. With the rise 
of critical international law scholarship in the late 1980s, the objectivity claim of 
normative international law has decisively fallen apart. 
III.  SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW  
The social science approach suggested by Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg 
examines the phenomenon of international law by using conventional, empirical, 
and positivistic social sciences. 17 This external approach may be conveniently 
referred to as the social science approach to international law. The basic procedure 
 
13  On the irresolvable tension between concreteness and normativity, see generally MARTTI 
KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ARGUMENT (2005). 
14  See North Sea Continental Shelf (FRG/Den.; FRG/Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 74 (Feb. 
20). 
15  Id. 
16  In rediscovering the importance of the persistent objector doctrine due to the changing conditions 
of international lawmaking, Ted Stein claimed her work to be “an exercise in the sociology of 
international law.” See Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent 
Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 457, 481 (1985). A critical reading of the persistent 
objector doctrine is well argued by B. S. Chimni, Customary International Law: A Third World Perspective, 
112 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 23–25 (2018). 
17  See generally Abebe et al., supra note 1. 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 42 Vol. 22 No. 1 
is to start with a research question, develop a hypothesis, then verify or falsify the 
hypothesis through observation and data collection. In reducing and limiting its 
research task to descriptive engagement without a normative commitment, the 
social science approach advocates a revitalization of the scientific enterprise of 
international law. 
In a sense, the social science approach and the normative approach share a 
common interest in scientism and objectivity despite the profound difference 
between the two approaches. The social science approach replaces the 
normatively-committed objective rules with a new set of empirically-committed 
objective rules. The scientism of the social science approach also needs to be 
demystified.  
The social science approach is premised upon the full separation between 
the subjective and the objective.18 It further assumes the objective being real, 
fixed, unmalleable, and organized – capable of scientific studies without subjective 
intervention. This approach is epistemologically incomplete, if not completely 
impossible. First, no social science is completely neutral, objective, and value-free. 
Social sciences are as politically informed as international legal studies. The 
application of the social science approach to international law requires a scholar 
to make many subjective choices throughout the research process. In defining the 
research question, setting the context, identifying the variables, relating variables 
as cause and consequence, collecting and interpreting the data, establishing the 
causal link, generalizing the research outcomes, and more, one is constantly called 
to make subjective decisions.19 Those delicate decisions are not readily accessible 
in the disciplinary toolboxes of social sciences or international law. Instead, one 
must make decisions creatively. 
How contrary state practice is treated in identification of customary 
international law provides an illustrative example. Torture is prohibited by the 
1984 U.N. Convention against Torture.20 Given that the practice of torture is 
widely found across the world, the question immediately arises whether customary 
international law authorizes or prohibits torture.21 The techniques employed by 
the traditional approach elaborate and define what counts as state practice. One 
answer is to exclude those practices of torture from the purview of “state 
 
18  See BARRY HINDESS, PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 138–39 (1977). 
19  The range of subjective selection is manifestly acknowledged in the classics on quantitative social 
research. See, e.g., GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL 
INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1994). 
20  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.  
21  This was a point of debate between Arthur Weisburd and Anthony D’Amato in the 1980s on 
whether the prohibition of torture was purely conventional by nature. See Arthur M. Weisburd, 
Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (1988); Anthony 
D’Amato, Custom and Treaty: A Response to Professor Weisburd, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 459 (1988). 
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practice.” For the purpose of customary lawmaking, state practice is norm-
generative only if it is accompanied by an opinio juris.22 Because no state has claimed 
that torture is lawful under international law, the practice of torture would not be 
able to create a law permissible of torture. 
The other technique is to define state practice by pairing actions with 
responses from other states.23 Whenever incidents of torture are exposed, they are 
deplored by other states and human rights organizations. It is the acts of torture 
by a state together with the collective responses from other states that constitute 
state practice on the legality of torture under international law. Both techniques 
are presented as factual matters of what to observe and what counts. 
Second, observations and interpretations generate the world we see. 
Personal preferences, beliefs, values, or research methods often determine 
research outcomes. In essence, social science is about constructing narratives and 
order. Data only receive meaning when they are theoretically exposed and 
interpreted. Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg provide an illuminating example in 
their article. Using basically the same data, Beth Simmons and Eric Posner drew 
opposite conclusions about the effectiveness of international human rights 
agreements.24 
Another useful example could be found on the scholarly examination of the 
breadth of the territorial sea. According to a survey conducted by the United 
Nations in 1983, 18 states claimed 3 nautical miles of territorial sea, 83 states 
claimed 12 nautical miles, 13 states claimed 200 nautical miles, and another 19 
states claimed different ranges.25 The question is then how far the territorial sea 
reaches under customary international law. 
The above claims are open to different interpretations. One interpretation 
could simply deny the existence of customary international law on the subject 
matter, as state practices diverge. 26  Another interpretation may suggest the 
continued validity of the rule of 3 miles, as this is the least disputable.27 Still 
 
22  See North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, at ¶ 77. 
23  See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A 
Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 754, 784 (2001). 
24  See Abebe et al., supra note 1, at 21 (discussing BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009) and ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014)). 
25  The Law of the Sea Bulletin, No. 2, vi, U.N. Doc. 83-35821 (Dec. 1983). 
26  Michael Byers therefore interprets the 3 nautical miles as a mistaken belief among scholars on the 
customary breadth of the territorial sea. See Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules - 
Customary International Law from an Interdisciplinary Perspective, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 109, 173 (1995). 
27  See R.Y. Jennings, General Course on Principles of Public International Law, 121 COLLECTED COURSES 
HAGUE ACAD. INT’L L. 323, 379 (1967). Yet, for a rational choice explanation of the 3 nautical miles 
rule and its subsequent development, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary 
International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1158 (1999). 
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another interpretation points to the rule of 12 miles, as this rule is endorsed by 
the majority and also incorporates the latest development in state practice.28 
All of the above interpretations stand equally. A choice can be made only by 
reference to policy considerations and normative commitments beyond mere 
factual observation. More importantly, the difference between interpretations is 
irresolvable within the social science approach itself as Abebe, Chilton, and 
Ginsburg seem to suggest.29 The difference does not lie in observations, but rather 
in assumptions and orientations. 
Third, by reducing itself to the study of what “is,” the social science approach 
risks consolidating and legitimizing existing social structure and order. The social 
science approach gives authenticity to empirical facts and data by assuming that 
the truth may be meaningfully extracted from the given. Yet, what is the being, 
what aspects of social life are real, and what is observable are all at the heart of 
the positivism of social sciences. Objectifying certain aspects of social life to 
present them as irresistible and capable of generating meaning and order has 
profound intellectual, social, and political implications. 30  Having renounced a 
political commitment in the first place, the social science approach is left to be fed 
by dominant narratives about world reality. Expressly not committing oneself to 
a normative project amounts to a normative commitment in its own right. 
IV.  RELATING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO SOCIAL SCIENCES 
The social science approach is primarily concerned with international law’s 
efficacy and rationale. It focuses “on external questions like why states make 
international commitments, how international institutions make decisions, and 
whether international commitments or the decisions of international institutions 
produce changes in state behavior.” 31  The social science approach, as such, 
incorporates rather specific parochial concepts of both international law and social 
science. This reductionist approach may hinder a more dynamic and interactive 
discourse between international law and social science. 
The social science approach suffers from three reductionist deficiencies. The 
first is its positivistic conception of the social science method. In limiting itself to 
the empirical method and external explanation, the social science approach, as 
proposed by Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg,32 minimizes the contributions of 
 
28  Those arguing for 200 nautical miles are not seen as persistent objectors to the customary rule of 
12 nautical miles. See Bing Bing Jia, The Relations Between Treaties and Custom, 9 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 
81, 89 (2010). 
29  See Abebe et al., supra note 1, at 21–22. 
30  For an insightful account of the ordering power of description, see Anne Orford, In Praise of 
Description, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 609 (2012). 
31  See Abebe et al., supra note 1, at 18. 
32  Id. 
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political science, anthropology, linguistics, or history. It focuses on efficacy and 
causality to the exclusion of other analytic paradigms, such as structural-
functionalism, hermeneutics, critical theory, and systems theory. 
The second reductionist aspect is its conception of international law. The 
social science approach incarnates a robust positivist and statist concept of law. 
International law is seen as consisting of binding rules and principles whose effects 
are to endure test by empiricism. However, in international society, the 
constitutive role of international law is as relevant as its normative function. While 
a rule-based formalistic notion of international law still stands firm, especially in 
international adjudication, other concepts receive increasing acceptance. 
International law is a language of empowerment that legitimizes specific 
claims or actions. By formulating conceptual, paradigmatic, or epistemic 
frameworks, it conditions our understanding of international problems and 
defines the available solutions. The role and relevance of international law are 
much richer than what the positivistic concept may embrace. 
The normativity of international law may be considered in a dual agenda: 
authoritative in adjudication and decision-making, but also normative in terms of 
its political commitments. The traditional approach presents it as a system of rule-
based normativity without normative projects other than international law itself. 
Disconnecting these two levels of normativity is artificial and leads to the practical 
irrelevance of international law to international life. 
The third reductionist aspect is the relationship between international law 
and social science. The social science approach depicts these as two distinct fields 
which only relate to each other externally. In fact, they are mutually constitutive. 
It is important to appreciate the constitutive role of concepts and doctrines of 
international law in the design of the research project, as well as in the 
interpretation of the results. 
Nevertheless, an enriched social science approach would provide useful 
insights for developing international law projects. The mechanisms of causation 
and attribution are powerful institutions for social redistribution.33 For example, 
the underlying causes of poverty in the Global South are subject to different 
interpretations. In turn, these different interpretations point to different 
prescriptions. Poverty may be seen as a consequence of the corruption and failure 
of local governments. It may also be attributed to the lack of legal institutions for 
privatization, property protection, or effective markets. Additionally, it may be 
attributable to the structural status of countries in the Global South in the 
international economic system. Each of these interpretations may be equally valid 
and yet points to different prescriptions. Here, causation plays an important role 
in conditioning our understanding of what the world problem is, who shall bear 
 
33  For an insightful exposition and critique of causational analysis applied to human rights issues, see 
Susan Marks, Human Rights and Root Causes, 74 MOD. L. REV. 57 (2011). 
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responsibilities, and where to look for possible solutions. A social science project 
would be useful to substantiate the normative projects of international law 
regarding global poverty. 
A modest and self-reflective social science approach is useful, but not 
because it provides objective, verifiable scientific knowledge. Rather, it offers a 
way to understand how international legal problems may be defined, how the 
order of the world may be depicted, and how politics of international law may be 
conducted at a micro level. 
I would suggest an active incorporation of the social sciences into 
international law. Various arguments against international legal studies as a social 
science can be anticipated. Philosophically, the normative system of international 
law cannot be subjected to Popper’s falsificationist approach, falling under the 
criteria of science.34 Conceptually, the normative approach to law—sometimes 
referred to as the authority paradigm—tells very little about international society.35 
Intellectually, the social science approach often entertains skepticism or even 
hostility toward the legal nature of international law, and a call for interdisciplinary 
engagement often means conquest in reality.36 Politically, much of the existing 
work on the social science approach is viewed as conservative. 37 
Yet, it is both important and possible to relate international law to social 
science in a more dynamic and mutually informative manner. There are several 
useful ways to relate the two subjects. The first possibility is to open the normative 
approach by relocating its background assumptions to the foreground for 
discussion.38 In approaching international law as a project for social reform, it is 
useful to openly acknowledge the sociological assumptions and political ideals that 
underlie the international law project. To make those assumptions explicit would 
do away with the false normative objectivity that has been associated with 
international law. Connecting legal normativity with political normativity would 
enable more direct engagement with foundational ideas about the world in 
international legal discourse. And any reflections of those assumptions would 
practically require sociological investigation and political engagement. 
 
34  See KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 40–42 (1959). 
35  For discussion of the authority paradigm, see Geoffrey Samuel, Is Law Really a Social Science? A View 
from Comparative Law, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 288 (2008). 
36  See Jan Klabbers, The Relative Autonomy of International Law or the Forgotten Politics of Interdisciplinarity, 1 
J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 35 (2005). 
37  See Martti Koskenniemi, Law, Teleology and International Relations: An Essay in Counterdisciplinarity, 26 
INT’L REL. 3, 16 (2012). 
38  See DAVID KENNEDY, A WORLD OF STRUGGLE: HOW POWER, LAW, AND EXPERTISE SHAPE 
GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 114 (2016). 
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A second way of relating is to openly examine the constitutive role of 
international law in social science. 39  International law today is a powerful 
institution that determines how international issues are framed and resolved. Its 
politics is often expressed in the politics of competing perspectives and outlooks. 
The empirical approach requires theoretical sensitivity in its normative 
assumptions, intellectual reflection about the subjective decisions made in 
selecting and processing data, and prudence when drawing normative conclusions 
from collected facts. 
The third way of relating is to conduct interdisciplinary projects internal to 
international law. International law projects by themselves are capable of speaking 
to historians, political scientists, and scholars of international relations. As Jan 
Klabbers comments, “the best work in international law tends to be individual 
work that is well-informed about neighboring disciplines, and would be readable 
and understandable to those neighboring disciplines, and perhaps even contribute 
something to those disciplines, without however losing its distinctively legal 
character.” 40  Those works are read as legal works par excellence. This raises 
interesting questions about what constitutes an internal approach to international 
law and where to draw its disciplinary boundaries. To conduct interdisciplinary 
projects internal to the discipline of international law would require international 
lawyers to be open-minded to the social sciences, and more importantly, be able 
to internalize those neighboring disciplines in the landscape of legal research. 
V.  CONCLUSION  
What distinguishes international law from domestic law is its constitutive 
role for international society. International law always points to the future and is 
an enterprise that constantly aims to transcend the contemporary conditions of 
human life. International law has constantly been formulated by professionals as 
a project for social reform. International legal scholarship, the social science 
approach included, by itself is part of the international lawmaking process. 
The legitimacy of international law should not take refuge in objectivity or 
scientism. The validity of international law may not come from an external 
verification through economics or sociology. A reductionistic social science 
approach to international law risks consolidating existing inequalities and 
imperialistic institutions in the name of objective science. Such an approach may 
also reduce international law to a set of policy options coded in administrative 
vocabulary. As international law constantly oscillates between faith, normativity, 
and theology on the one end and practice, facts, and science on the other, it is 
 
39  Early calls for such interdisciplinary collaboration go back to the 1980s. See, e.g., Christopher C. 
Joyner, Crossing the Great Divide: Views of a Political Scientist Wandering in the World of International Law, 
81 PROCEEDINGS ANN. MEETING AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 385 (1987). 
40  Klabbers, supra note 36, at 45.  
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important to steer it as an intellectual space for rational discourse, as well as a 
political space for progressive social projects. 
A healthy interaction between international law and the social sciences 
requires enriched conceptions of both, as well as a proper perspective on their 
working relationship. It is important for international law to absorb a social-
historical perspective and transform legal scholarship from an authority paradigm 
to a more socially informed and politically relevant intellectual project. 
